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Abstract— Existing automotive Hazard Analysis and Risk 
Assessment (HARA) process as discussed by the international 
standard ISO 26262 is static in nature. While the standard 
describes a systematic process to incorporate functional safety in 
the development process of Electrical & Electronic (E/E) systems, 
it fails to address the needs of Advanced Driver Assistance 
Systems (ADAS) and Automated Driving (AD) systems. In order 
to ensure the safety of ADAS and AD systems, it is important to 
incorporate the changing nature of interactions between the 
system and the environment, in the safety analysis process for 
ADAS and AD systems. In this paper, the authors argue the need 
for a dynamic approach for automotive safety analysis by 
adapting the tactical safety for ADAS and AD systems depending 
on the real-time operational capability and real-time ASIL 
(Automotive Safety Integrity Level) rating of a situation, and 
discuss a framework for this process. The novelty and therefore 
contribution of this paper lies in the proposed ASIL inspired 
dynamic tactical safety framework, which evaluates the severity, 
controllability and exposure ratings in real-time based on the 
real time values of the various vehicle and environment 
parameters. These ratings are used to assign a real-time ASIL 
value which is used to determine the tactical decisions in order to 
lower the ASIL value in real-time by altering the functional 
(operational) capability of the system. Furthermore, the 
framework is explained with the help of a case study based on a 
combined Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and Autonomous 
Emergency Braking (AEB) system. 
Keywords— ISO 26262, Tactical decisions, Hazards, HARA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing focus on the introduction of Advanced 
Driver Assistance Systems (ADASs) and Automated Driving 
(AD) systems is driven by their potential to increase safety of 
the vehicle occupants and others in the environment. This is 
because the cause of over 90% of the on-road accidents has 
been attributed to driver error [1]. Therefore, the ability of 
ADAS and AD systems to assist or replace the driver 
(respectively), has the potential to reduce the number of 
accidents as these systems can potentially identify and react to 
hazardous situations better than the human driver [2]. 
However, one of the major challenges for ADAS and AD 
systems is to ensure the safe working of these systems. 
ADAS and AD systems differ from more conventional 
automotive Electrical/Electronic (E/E) systems in their 
increased dependence on the quality of environment perception 
and its attributes to ensure safety [3]. This dependence proves 
to be a challenge for testing of these systems [4] and also for 
their safe functioning. The large number of possible scenarios 
make it hard to ensure completeness of the functional scope 
and subsequent set of possible safety goals which ensure the 
safety of the systems. Additionally, the changing nature of the 
interaction of the ADAS and AD systems with the environment 
makes it challenging to ensure safety of the system with a static 
approach to risk analysis. With the developments in AD 
systems, it is expected that the systems will be able to deal with 
the three levels of driving task: limited strategic, tactical and 
operational [5]; while ADAS systems can perform only 
operational tasks. At a strategic level, tasks include route 
planning which have limited safety implications. Moreover, the 
strategic goals can be decomposed into tactical goals and any 
limited safety implications at the strategic level will be 
magnified to an extent that it can be addressed at the tactical 
level. Therefore, for the scope of this paper, the authors will 
address the tactical and operational driving tasks and the trade-
off required between them to ensure the safety of an ADAS 
and AD systems.  
In this paper, the authors argue for a dynamic approach to 
tactical decisions for ADAS and AD systems. Drawing 
learnings from similar challenges faced by the chemical 
process industry and their shift to a more dynamic approach, 
the authors propose a framework for the dynamic approach 
based on real-time ASIL value for the situation (hazardous 
event). A static HARA fails to capture the real-time state of the 
system and the environment which may have a bearing on the 
risk analysis probabilities. One of the main reasons for a 
dynamic approach is to secure the availability of the ADAS 
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and AD systems albeit with reduced operational capability in 
the presence of a hazardous event. 
In Section II of this paper, risk analysis methods from other 
domains, and their shift to a more dynamic approach is 
discussed. Section III discusses the automotive HARA process, 
Section IV discusses the trade-off between operational and 
tactical decisions, along with the challenges offered by ADAS 
and AD systems. Section V introduces the dynamic tactical 
decision making framework. Section VI discusses a case study 
for a system with Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and 
Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB) features, in which the 
proposed dynamic tactical decision making approach is 
applied. Finally, section VII concludes the paper. 
II. RISK ANALYSIS IN OTHER DOMAINS 
Risk analysis gathered initial momentum in the nuclear 
sector, later shifting to chemical process industry, aviation and 
railways. Risk analysis in the automotive domain is a more 
recent activity. While risk analysis in the nuclear industry is 
quantitative, the chemical process industry initially followed a 
qualitative approach and later a hybrid approach of quantitative 
and qualitative risk analysis [6].  Qualitative risk analysis is 
criticized for its vagueness in terminology, arbitrariness and 
lack of transparency in selection of worst case events [7]. 
While Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) [8] is able to 
overcome most of these criticisms, it has the disadvantage of 
being computationally intensive. However, the recent 
improvements in on-board and off-board data acquisition 
systems are able to overcome this limitation. One of the 
applications of QRA in the chemical industry is risk based 
design which plays an important role in risk reduction [9]. An 
analytical approach adopted in a QRA helps in achieving 
reliable results in estimating the impact of hazards [10]. 
However, estimating the frequency of hazards as part of 
conventional QRA quickly became obsolete as it needed to 
take into consideration the realistic values of failure probability 
based on real-time conditions of systems and failures [11]. 
Classical QRA is a static process, giving a risk picture “frozen 
in time” [6], and fails to take into consideration the unsafe 
interactions [12]. As processes become complex, risk 
assessment made for a particular phase may not be appropriate 
for another phase of the system application [13]. While risk 
assessment has been conducted in the chemical process 
industry for many years, history has shown that similar 
accidents repeat themselves (Bhopal 1984 [14] and Texas City 
2005 [15]). This has led to several efforts towards a dynamic 
approach to risk assessment in the chemical process industry 
[16]. Traditional risk assessment is based on measuring 
deviations from pre-defined (static) thresholds and fail to 
capture variation in risk during continuous operation [17]. 
However, in a dynamic approach, a continuous re-calculation 
of the probabilities is done based on the system and 
environment state, helping in detecting early warnings and 
near-miss scenarios. An incident or a near-miss scenario 
represents a breach of a safety mechanism and needs to be 
captured as it will influence failure probabilities. Such events 
have been mentioned in the chemical process industry 
literature as Accident Sequence Precursors (ASP) [18]. This is 
evident from the study of the BP Texas city refinery accident, 
where detection of near-misses, coupled with a dynamic 
approach to update risk assessment could have prevented the 
accident [10]. 
In order to have correct evaluation of risk, the analysis 
needs to be based on accurate data which represents the 
situation in real time [10]. One of the fundamental issues with 
risk analysis is due to the variation in the understanding and 
definition of “risk”. Different risk definitions may cause 
variation in the risk assessment process. In this paper, the 
authors adopt the definition of risk from the ISO 26262 
standard [19], which defines risk as the “combination of the 
probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that 
harm.” A dynamic approach provides an ability to cope with 
variations in system’s operation without total loss of 
functionality. 
Dynamic Risk Analysis Approaches 
While initial efforts towards a dynamic approach were 
made by some authors [20]–[22], the most developed 
methodology is termed Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) 
which dynamically estimates probabilities for accidents using 
Bayesian failure mechanism and consequence analysis [12], 
[17]. Two additional steps as compared to conventional risk 
analysis are key to this approach. These include updating 
accident analysis and failure probabilities. Firstly, for updating 
accident analysis, event/fault tree (bow tie approach [23]) is 
used in addition to real-time process data. Secondly, to update 
probabilities, Bayesian functions are used. Alternatively, a 
non-Bayesian approach to probability updating can be applied 
which requires real-time parameter values and status health of 
the system [17], [23]. The versatility of the DRA method for 
chemical process systems has been demonstrated by 
applications in real life cases like BP Texas Refinery accident 
[15], off shore drilling [24] and BP Deepwater Horizon 
accident [25]. However, the DRA approach too falls short in 
certain aspects. None of the DRA approaches (bow-tie, 
Bayesian etc.) is able to update both failure probabilities and 
consequences in real-time [26]. 
In order to overcome some of the challenges of DRA, the 
DRA and Dynamic Procedure for Atypical Scenarios 
Identification (DyPASI) methods have been combined in some 
studies [27]. DyPASI is a hazard identification process and 
improves the completeness of the hazards by identifying worst 
case scenarios [16], [18]. Other DRA approaches used in 
chemical process industry include using a risk barometer [16]. 
These dynamic approaches help in reducing risk by monitoring 
the state of safety critical barriers using real time data 
associated with the systems. 
III. AUTOMOTIVE HARA PROCESS 
Automotive HARA is followed as per the ISO 26262 
standard which is considered as the state-of-the-art for ensuring 
safety of E/E systems in the automotive domain. The standard 
introduces the concept of the Automotive Safety Integrity 
Level or ASIL rating. An ASIL rating is obtained from an 
ASIL determination table which has three parameters: 
Severity, Controllability and Exposure. ISO 26262 identifies 
various ASIL levels which are QM, ASIL A, ASIL B, ASIL C 
            
Fig. 1. Dynamic tactical decision making framework 
 
and ASIL D, with ASIL D being the highest integrity level 
necessitating the most rigorous requirements on the product 
development cycle and QM being the lowest integrity level. 
However, the determination of ASIL ratings is subjective and 
is based on expert opinion which causes variation in the ratings 
assigned to a hazardous event [28]. There is also 
questionability on the scientific approach to explain how the 
ratings affect safety [29]. 
An automotive safety analysis process, like other domains 
is essentially a two stage process. The first step involves 
identification of hazards and their corresponding hazardous 
events, which should (ideally) have a corresponding Safety 
Goal (SG). A hazardous event is defined as the “combination 
of a hazard and an operational situation” [19]. One of the 
challenges offered by ADAS and AD systems is the ability to 
identify various hazardous events during analysis and the lack 
of a systematic approach to address this issue. One approach to 
tackle this challenge is to define a generic hazard and 
subsequently hazardous events. While this would benefit from 
a shorter and easier HARA, it might suffer from high ASIL 
levels due to wider safety implications and the temptation to 
select worst case events. A high ASIL may lead to higher 
development cost due to the additional design and verification 
efforts recommended in ISO 26262, making the approach 
infeasible for the automotive industry. Alternately, a more 
exhaustive set of hazards and hazardous events might lead to 
lower ASIL levels of some sub-systems. It might be prudent to 
adopt the later approach to ensure completeness within the 
resource constraints. 
The second step involves the HARA process, in which the 
identified hazardous event is assigned an ASIL rating which is 
evaluated based on the severity, exposure and controllability 
ratings for the hazardous event. The authors adopt an objective 
approach to ASIL classification as defined in [28]. 
IV. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AND SAFETY 
Safety during a driving task can be considered individually 
for each of the three driving tasks: strategic, tactical and 
operational. Strategic safety may be achieved by, for example 
route planning of a route with less traffic or where the exposure 
of vulnerable road users is less as compared to other available 
route options. Strategic safety is achieved at a higher 
abstraction level. Tactical safety may be achieved by making 
decisions about vehicle parameters like speed, distance 
between the lead car and own vehicle, carrying out an 
overtaking manoeuvre etc., in a way that reduces the overall 
risk of the system and scenario. Operational safety involves the 
ability of the sensing system to perceive the environment and 
the use of actuators (brakes, accelerator, steering wheel etc.) 
safely and understanding their capabilities and limitations. This 
paper will discuss the trade-off between the tactical and the 
operational decision making and its impact on ensuring safety 
of the system. A manual driver is able to make this trade-off as 
the driver has the full responsibility of the tactical task and the 
operational task. The clear assignment of responsibility makes 
it easier to operate safely in the absence of automation. 
The introduction of ADAS blurs the boundaries of 
responsibility making it difficult to allocate responsibility for 
safety related decisions. Both ADAS and AD systems need to 
make operational choices as part of the driving task. However, 
the difference in the nature of these interactions for the two 
systems lead to a different safety assessment for them. ADAS 
is an assisting system and always has the driver as a fall back 
measure, which means that the operational choices for driving 
task is shared between the driver and ADAS, without clear role 
assignment. However, for an AD system, both tactical and 
operational tasks rest with the system [3]. Since the AD system 
has control over both tactical and operational tasks, an efficient 
strategy could be devised for a trade-off between the two tasks. 
In other words, the tactical decision making system should 
request only those functions which the operational system can 
perform [30]. 
While some authors have argued that implementing ADAS 
is easier than an AD system from a technological point of view 
[31], the reverse is true from a functional safety perspective 
[30]. While dynamic approaches in other domains have 
considered continuously updating the frequency and 
consequence factors, an additional factor of controllability 
needs to be updated in the automotive risk assessment process 
(when ADAS is being considered). As automated automotive 
systems evolve, one possible solution to achieve a trade-off 
between the operational and tactical task depending on the real-
time situation of an ADAS or an AD system would be to adopt 
a dynamic approach to tactical decisions. 
V. DYNAMIC TACTICAL DECISION MAKING FRAMEWORK 
In order to adapt the tactical decisions to incorporate the 
changing operational capability and interactions between the 
system and the environment, the authors propose an ASIL 
inspired dynamic framework (Fig. 1). The proposed framework 
has the following aspects: 
1. Item definition 
2. Hazardous event detection system 
3. Objectification of Automotive HARA 
4. Real-time ASIL determination 
5. Decision and Control for countermeasure (updating 
item definition to lower the ASIL) 
            
Fig. 2. Real-time ASIL Determination framework 
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The first step in the proposed process involves defining the 
function or the item. This definition is essential for establishing 
the capability of the function and the different possible modes 
of the function in which the function availability can be 
increased by reducing the capability of the functionality, i.e., 
altering the item definition. One of the key aspects of the 
framework is the ability of the system to identify a hazardous 
event which is achieved by the hazardous event detection 
system in Fig. 1. An item is defined as the “system or array of 
systems to implement a function at the vehicle level, to which 
ISO 26262 is applied” [19]. The benefit of proposed process 
over dynamic risk analysis framework (discussed in section II) 
is the ability to evaluate all three aspects (severity, 
controllability and exposure) in real time as compared to only 
probabilities. In the automotive context, all three parameters 
are context dependent. 
A. Objectification of Automotive HARA 
Automotive HARA like other domains suffers from 
reliability issues causing variation in ratings [28]. Two types of 
variation exist: 1) inter-rateability variation and 2) intra-
rateability variation. Objectification of the HARA process aims 
to remove these two types of variation which are caused by 
different mental models between experts and their varying 
mental models over time. Objectification of the automotive 
HARA involves parametrization of the Severity, Exposure and 
the Controllability ratings to create a rule set for assigning an 
ASIL rating based on the values of the parameters [28]. 
Objectification of the HARA process is an essential 
prerequisite for establishing a real-time ASIL value for a given 
hazardous event. A sample rule-set for severity rating is shown 
in Table 1. 
TABLE I.  SEVERITY PARAMETERS AND SEVERITY RULE-SET 
Type of 
Obstacle a 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
Pedestrian 
< 11 kmph 
< 2 kmph S0 
< 6 kmph S1 
< 12 kmph S1 
11 - 16 kmph 
< 2 kmph S1 
< 6 kmph S2 
< 12 kmph S2 
> 16 kmph 
< 2 kmph S2 
< 6 kmph S3 
< 12 kmph S3 
a. Table from section 3.1 in [28] 
B. Real time parameter monitoring and ASIL determination 
In order to evaluate the ASIL rating for a hazardous event 
dynamically, the parameters identified for objectification of the 
HARA process need to be measured in real-time and fed to the 
ASIL determination engine. This enables an accurate ASIL 
determination based on the current vehicle and environment 
states (Fig. 2). 
C. Decision and Control for countermeasure 
The Decision and Control (DC) sub-system receives the 
real-time ASIL rating and the sensors values for environment 
perception to make a tactical choice for the vehicle which is 
within the operational boundary of the vehicle. In other words, 
the DC subsystem performs the task of the mode selection (i.e., 
a safety measure) to modify the ASIL value for the current 
hazardous event situation in order to secure the availability of 
the system, albeit with reduced capability. The operational 
boundary of the vehicle is inspired by the real-time ASIL 
rating for the situation and sensor values (environment 
perception). Once an ASIL rating and the operational boundary 
of the system are established for a given hazardous event, the 
counter-measure is determined (which is a trade-off between 
the tactical and the operational task).  
A countermeasure could have any one of the following four 
attributes [18]: 
1. To avoid: an attribute acting upstream in the accident 
model 
2. To prevent: an attribute acting upstream in the 
accident model 
3. To control: an attribute acting downstream in the 
accident model 
4. To limit: an attribute acting downstream in the 
accident model 
However, the decision to choose between one of the four 
countermeasures is also dependent on the system’s operational 
capability to achieve the countermeasure action. Therefore, the 
real-time operational capability needs to be monitored to define 
the tactical behaviour (which involves the countermeasure 
action) of the ADAS or AD system. The tactical decision 
becomes the safety measure for the identified hazardous event 
which alters the parameters determining the ASIL rating to 
lower the ASIL rating assigned to the situation (Fig. 3) and 
thus increasing the availability of the system with lower 
functionality. 
  
Fig. 4. ACC + AEB system architecture 
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Fig. 5. ACC + AEB Scenario under consideration 
VI. CASE STUDY 
An example case study is presented in this paper, 
explaining the application of the dynamic tactical decision 
making framework. The case study uses an ADAS with ACC 
and AEB capability as an example. 
A. Function Definition: Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) + 
Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB) system 
A system with Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) system and 
Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB) capability performing 
the longitudinal control for the vehicle is chosen as an 
example. An ACC system maintains a set headway between 
the host vehicle and the target vehicle. An ACC system has the 
capability to adapt the speed of the vehicle and apply brakes 
(within certain design limitations). An AEB system performs 
emergency (severe) braking by applying necessary braking 
force in order to avoid an obstacle. In the system under 
discussion, an ACC + AEB system has tasks of applying the 
brakes and throttle based on the set speed and road traffic 
(tactical choice being the selection of the priority of the 
operational decisions). An ACC system is known to have 
decreased capability during fog and rain. Within the dynamic 
framework, this information will be provided by the sensors (in 
real time) to the ASIL level determination engine, which will 
use the objectification engine to derive a real-time ASIL for the 
ACC + AEB system in the given situation. However, in order 
to classify an ASIL value, the hazardous event detection 
system needs to identify the hazardous event. For the ACC + 
AEB system, this is achieved by a water spray detection system 
which detects the presence of water spray (Fig. 4). 
B. Scenario and Hazard Definition 
In this case study the authors present a scenario in which 
the host vehicle (HV) equipped with radar based ACC + AEB 
system is following a target vehicle (TV) or lead vehicle. The 
HV has a rear vehicle (RV) traveling behind it (Fig. 5). For the 
given scenario, the hazard under consideration is the 
“unintended braking” of the host vehicle which could 
potentially cause a collision from behind between the RV and 
the HV. The hazardous event being considered for the given 
hazard is, “water spray causing unintended braking leading to 
collision” as the water spray is being falsely interpreted as a 
lead vehicle by the radar system. 
C. Parameterization 
The following parameters were identified for the system 
and scenario under consideration: vehicle type, relative 
distance, relative speed and acceleration/deceleration. The 
parameters are used to assign a real-time ASIL value for the 
hazardous event. As the relative speed increased between HV 
and RV, the ASIL value decreased for the hazardous event. 
D. Dynamic Tactical Safety Decisions 
Let us assume that TV and HV are traveling with a speed of 
72 kmph, with a relative distance of 40m and both vehicles 
(types) are passenger vehicles. In addition, let us assume the 
same characteristics for HV and RV combination, except that 
the relative distance is 20m. The unintended deceleration of 
HV is 0.8g. For the given set of parameter values and 
hazardous event, the real-time ASIL determination system (via 
the objectification of ASIL ratings’ rule-set) assigns an ASIL D 
value (Severity: S3, Exposure: E4 and Controllability: C3) for 
the hazardous event. In order to bring the ASIL to a lower 
value, a safety measure needs to be introduced. A tactical 
decision altering the values of the parameters (speed, 
acceleration/deceleration and relative distance used for ASIL 
determination) could be a possible safety measure. 
Assuming TV and RV have constant speed, a tactical 
decision can be implemented to reduce the HV speed, 
increasing the relative speed between HV and TV and thus 
lowering the ASIL rating. Alternatively, a tactical decision 
could be to increase the speed of HV, increasing the relative 
speed between HV and RV and thus lowering the ASIL rating 
by lowering the Severity rating from S3 to S2 and 
controllability rating from C3 to C2, while exposure remains 
same at the highest value of E4. This reduces the ASIL rating 
from ASIL D to ASIL B (Fig. 6). Since the hazardous event 
under consideration is collision from behind, the later approach 
is valid until a frontal collision becomes a new hazardous 
event. This presents a situation where the possible tactical 
decision options are conflicting in nature and an optimization is 
needed between the two tactical decisions. 
It is important to note that the success of the proposed 
process is dependent upon a well-developed hazard detection 
system which in itself will be an ASIL D sub-system. 
However, the proposed process is highly scalable as the ASIL 
determination is based on priori parameters identified. Future 
manuscripts will discuss the real world implementation of the 
proposed concept and demonstrate the scalability in 
combinatorial real-world decision making situations. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
One of the major drawbacks of conventional risk 
assessment methods is that it gives a picture “frozen in time”. 
They are unable to take into consideration the changing risk 
nature due to environmental changes. A shift to dynamic risk 
assessment has been seen in other industries which faced 
similar challenges like the automotive domain faces currently. 
The advent of ADAS and AD systems in the automotive 
industry have provided a challenge for ensuring safety of the 
systems. In this paper, the authors introduce a dynamic tactical 
and operational decision making framework which is inspired 
by real time ASIL for a situation for ADAS and AD system to 
better inform the system on the trade-off decision between the 
tactical and operational driving task choices. The authors argue 
that the conventional HARA process which is static in nature is 
not able to meet the challenges offered by the ADAS and AD 
systems to ensure their safety. The proposed dynamic approach 
is a five step approach and comprises of objectification of 
automotive HARA, real-time parameter monitoring, real-time 
ASIL rating determination and Decision and Control for 
countermeasure to update the functionality of the system. With 
the help of a preliminary case study of a system with ACC + 
AEB functionality, the authors demonstrate that by altering the 
tactical decisions to select a different mode of the functionality, 
the ASIL for the hazardous event is reduced. 
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